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Previous research suggests that utilitarian decisions to moral dilemmas often 
stem from analytic, controlled cognitive processes. Furthermore, processing 
disfluency can trigger analytic thinking and improve performance on tasks 
that require logic and cognitive reflection. In the present study we 
investigated how processing fluency affects the readiness with which people 
give utilitarian responses to both personal and impersonal dilemmas. 
Participants were presented in two different experimental blocks with 
dilemmas written in both easy- (fluent) and hard-to-read (disfluent) fonts. 
We expected that dilemmas written in a disfluent font would be associated 
with more utilitarian responses. Results supported this prediction, albeit only 
when the disfluent dilemmas appeared first, showing that participants 
endorsed more utilitarian actions in the disfluent condition than in the fluent 
condition across dilemma types. These data suggest that increasing 
processing disfluency by manipulating the font affects decisions in the moral 
domain. 
 
People are often faced with difficult moral dilemmas that can have 
important life changing consequences. Accordingly, an increasing body of 
work has sought to identify the different factors that affect moral judgments 
and decisions, as well as the processes underlying people’s moral choices. 
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The dual process theory of moral decision-making (Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2004) is a prominent psychological approach that distinguishes 
between two different systems (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 
1996), namely an intuitive emotional system, which tends to be fast and 
automatic, and a controlled cognitive one, which tends to be slow and 
deliberate. According to this theory, decisions involving intuition and 
emotion generally support deontological judgments in moral dilemmas, 
favoring the essential rights of a person (e.g., one should not sacrifice an 
individual, even if this implies saving a larger number of people). 
Conversely, controlled cognitive processing favors utilitarian judgments, 
which lead to the greater good (e.g., one should aim to save the larger 
number of people, even if this means sacrificing an individual)1. 
Numerous studies manipulating cognitive and emotional factors have 
provided support for the claim that utilitarian and deontological responses 
to moral dilemmas rely on dissociable cognitive processes. To illustrate, the 
prevalence of utilitarian responses has been found to increase as a result of 
manipulations that promote analytic over intuitive emotional processes. 
These include allowing participants more time to respond (Suter & Hertwig, 
2011), presenting dilemmas in a foreign language (Costa et al., 2014; Costa, 
Vives, & Corey, 2017), or requiring participants to complete the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) before they respond to dilemmas 
(Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012). Utilitarian responses are also more 
common among individuals with a rational style of thinking (Bartels, 2008) 
and with higher working memory capacity (Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). 
Conversely, manipulations that hamper controlled cognitive processes such 
as induced stress (Youssef et al., 2012) and cognitive load (Trémolière, De 
Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012) often result in a higher prevalence of 
deontological responses. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
increased analytic thinking constitutes a key path to utilitarian responses to 
moral dilemmas (but see Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015; Gürçay & 
Baron, 2017). 
Processing fluency (i.e., the experienced ease with which one 
processes information) may be another factor influencing moral reasoning, 
as it is a pervasive metacognitive cue that can have a substantial influence 
                                                        
1 While Greene et al.’s (2001, 2004) dual process model has provided the basis for a wide 
range of interesting studies about the role that emotion and cognition play in moral 
decision-making, it is not free from criticism. Many critiques focus on the vision of 
emotion and cognition working as two dissociable, antagonist and competitive cerebral 
processes, and they propose instead an interaction of both in moral decision-making (e.g., 
Duke & Bègue, 2015; Gürçay & Baron, 2017; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). 
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on reasoning and judgment across many domains (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009). These include, for example, judgments of truth (Reber & Schwarz, 
1999) and confidence (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007), where 
fluent stimuli are judged as truer and inspire more confidence than the same 
stimuli presented in a disfluent way. Studies have used a vast array of 
fluency manipulation techniques, including the visual ease with which 
stimuli are perceived (Alter et al., 2007; Reber & Schwarz, 1999), the ease 
with which stimuli are retrieved from memory (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 
1992) and priming procedures (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 
2014). A common processing fluency manipulation has been to present 
stimuli either in an easy- or difficult-to-read font (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009). Fonts that are harder to read are thought to increase experiences of 
processing difficulties (i.e., disfluency), which in turn can serve as a cue 
that more deliberative and effortful cognitive processes need to be activated 
(Alter et al., 2007; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Supporting this idea, there 
is evidence that processing disfluency can lead to better performance on 
different cognitive tasks. For example, presenting information in a difficult-
to-read font improves performance on the CRT and syllogistic reasoning 
tasks (Alter et al., 2007), the Moses Illusion task (Song & Schwarz, 2008; 
Swami et al., 2014) and beyond the laboratory, in educational settings 
(Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughan, 2010). Processing 
disfluency is also associated with lower belief in conspiracy theories 
(Swami et al., 2014). Taken together, the findings reviewed suggest that 
processing disfluency can trigger analytic thinking strategies, which may 
help overcome initial intuitive responses2. 
However, it is currently unclear whether perceptual disfluency can 
also affect people’s responses to moral dilemmas. To the best of our 
knowledge, only one study (Laham, Alter, & Goodwin, 2009) has examined 
a related issue, namely the role of fluency on evaluations of moral 
transgressions conducted by others (e.g., a family eating their dead dog for 
dinner). In this study, transgressions presented in an easy-to-read font were 
judged as less morally wrong than those presented in a difficult-to-read 
font. The authors argued that this tendency was due to the fact that the 
experience of fluency is hedonically marked, which would trigger a positive 
affective state. Relatedly, there is evidence that processing fluency can 
affect interpersonal evaluations, leading to more positive evaluations of 
individuals who are processed fluently, and more negative evaluations of 
                                                        
2 Although several studies have found that disfluent fonts improve performance on 
different cognitive tasks, some studies have failed to replicate this effect (Meyer et al., 
2015), or found it limited to individuals with high cognitive ability (Thompson et al., 
2013). 
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those who are processed disfluently (Lick & Johnson, 2015). Taken 
together, these studies suggest that fluency may indeed affect some aspects 
of moral reasoning. However, it is unclear whether fluency can affect how 
people respond to dilemmas involving a proposed utilitarian action (for a 
distinction between deciding in moral dilemmas and reacting to moral 
transgressions, see Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). Our main goal in the 
current work was to investigate this issue. 
As noted earlier, analytic thinking is thought to prompt utilitarian 
responses to moral dilemmas. If disfluency enhances analytic, controlled 
cognitive processing when people are faced with such dilemmas, then 
disfluency might result in more utilitarian responses. To investigate whether 
this is the case or not, we presented participants with a series of moral 
dilemmas, and manipulated the font in which these were displayed. Based 
on the work reviewed above, we hypothesized that participants would rate 
the proposed actions as more appropriate (i.e., more utilitarian responses) 
when dilemmas were displayed using a difficult-to-read (disfluent) font than 
when they were displayed using an easy-to-read (fluent) font (H1). 
Additionally, we aimed to examine whether a potential effect of 
disfluency would generalize across different dilemma types, or whether it 
would be restricted to certain types of dilemmas. Based on Greene et al. 
(2001, 2004), we distinguished between personal dilemmas (where the 
proposed action leads to serious bodily harm to the victim or victims, and 
this harm is not the result of deflecting an existing threat) and impersonal 
ones (involving the deflection of a threat but no agency). As compared to 
impersonal dilemmas, personal ones often elicit heightened emotional 
reactions leading to more frequent deontological responses. Thus, 
manipulations promoting analytic processing can have a stronger effect on 
personal dilemmas, as such processing may help to overcome the initial 
emotional response triggered by these scenarios (Costa et al., 2014; Duke & 
Bègue, 2015; Koenigs et al., 2007). Therefore, we further hypothesized that 
any effect of processing fluency would be stronger for personal than for 
impersonal dilemmas (H2). 
To exclude potential confounds of any effects of fluency, we recorded 
the time that participants spent reading the dilemmas, as well as 
participants’ self-reported mood. Utilitarian responses can be more common 
when people are given more time to respond (Suter & Hertwig, 2011; but 
see Gürçay & Baron, 2017). Thus, dilemmas written in a disfluent font may 
elicit more utilitarian responses than those written in a fluent font simply 
because reading the former type of font takes longer, and not because of the 
metacognitive cue provided. Additionally, we assessed participants’ mood 
because disfluent fonts may lead to a more negative mood (Alter et al., 
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2007). Negative moods can prompt more systematic processing (Schwarz, 
Bless, & Bohner, 1991). Thus, disfluency could also result in more 
utilitarian responses through its negative effect on mood, independently of 
the metacognitive experience of fluency itself. Indeed, as noted earlier, 
there is some evidence that fluency may elicit positive affect, which might 
translate into more positive evaluations of moral transgressions or of other 
people (Laham et al., 2009; Lick & Johnson, 2015). There is also evidence 
that positive affect can lead to more utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). Hence, we examined whether our fluency 
manipulation induced any changes in mood by registering participants’ self-
reported mood after both fluent and disfluent blocks of moral dilemmas. 
METHOD 
Participants. Fifty one undergraduate students (38 female, age range 
1734, M = 18.76, SD = 2.33) recruited from the Faculty of Psychology of 
the University of Granada took part in the study in exchange of course 
credit. All the procedures were approved by the local Ethics Committee on 
Human Research.  
 
Materials and Apparatus. All materials were presented using the 
survey programming software Unipark (www.unipark.de). 
Dilemmas3 
Two short dilemmas without moral content were used as practice 
trials, to familiarize participants with the structure of the decision-making 
task and with the fluent and disfluent conditions. The dilemmas (Brownies 
and Standard Turnips) were taken from Greene et al. (2004). They were 
followed by a question in which participants had to rate the appropriateness 
of the proposed action using a scale ranging from 1 (definitely no) to 6 
(definitely yes). 
We used four dilemmas, including two fillers (Stock Tip and Taxes), 
and two moral (Crying Baby and Burning Building) dilemmas, taken from 
Moore et al. (2008). The two moral dilemmas had an almost identical 
number of words (Crying Baby = 126; Burning Building = 129), and each of 
these dilemmas had both a personal and an impersonal version (with exactly 
the same number of words), resulting in a total of six dilemmas. In all cases 
participants were asked to indicate how appropriate they felt the proposed 
action was (e.g., Would it be appropriate for you to asphyxiate your child in 
                                                        
3 All dilemmas used in this study are included in Appendices A (Spanish) and B (English). 
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order to save yourself and the other hidden people?) using the same 
response scale as in the practice dilemmas4. 
All practice trials, dilemmas, and associated questions were written 
using Myriad Web 10-point font. In the disfluent font condition the words 
were at a 15% dark scale and italicized (see Alter et al., 2007, for a similar 
procedure). 
This is an example of the fluent font. 
This is an example of the disfluent font. 
Mood questions 
Following Alter et al. (2007), participants were asked to evaluate their 
mood on a response scale ranging from 1 (very sad) to 7 (very happy). 
Mood measurements were taken at three different points in the experiment, 
as will be described below. 
Design and Procedure. We used a 2 (Fluency: Fluent vs. Disfluent) x 
2 (Moral Dilemma Type: Personal vs. Impersonal) repeated measures 
design. Participants viewed all six dilemmas, presented in two blocks, each 
consisting of three dilemmas: the personal version of one of the moral 
dilemmas, the impersonal version of the other moral dilemma, and one of 
the filler dilemmas. That is, participants were presented with one block 
composed of the personal version of the Crying Baby, the impersonal 
version of the Burning Building, and the Stocktip dilemma, and another 
block composed of the impersonal version of the Crying Baby, the personal 
version of the Burning Building, and the Taxes dilemma. The order of 
presentation of dilemmas within each block was randomized. Each 
participant saw one block written in the fluent font and the other block 
written in the disfluent font. The order of blocks and fluency conditions was 
counterbalanced. To examine whether the specific order in which 
participants viewed the two blocks of dilemmas interacted with any effects 
of fluency, we included order as a factor in the analyses reported below. 
Upon arrival, participants sat in front of individual computer screens. 
They read and signed a consent form and subsequently read instructions 
asking them to imagine that the described situations were real, and that no 
other options (besides the two presented) were possible. To ensure that 
participants read and considered each dilemma, they were informed that 
                                                        
4 The moral dilemmas were sacrificial and self-benefit (the life of the person who commits 
sacrifice is also in danger). They were slightly modified to meet the criteria of unavoidable 
death (the potential victim of the sacrifice would die even if no action were taken). Moore 
et al. (2008) found that this kind of dilemmas was more sensitive to capture differences in 
participants’ working memory capacity. Thus, we reasoned that such dilemmas may be 
more sensitive to any effect of manipulating fluency. 
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they would have to answer questions about the content of the dilemmas, 
after all of them had been presented (e.g., ‘In the story of the baby, where 
were the people seeking refuge found?’ – the basement). 
Before the experimental blocks, participants answered basic 
demographic questions and responded to the first mood question. Next, they 
were given the practice trials, one written in the fluent font (Brownies) and 
the other one in the disfluent font (Standard Turnips), and rated the 
appropriateness of the proposed actions using the response scale described 
above. Participants were then presented with the first block of dilemmas. In 
all cases they were asked to read the dilemma and click on a ‘continue’ 
button to proceed to another screen displaying the corresponding question 
and response scale. Times spent reading each dilemma were unlimited and 
were recorded. 
Next, participants rated their mood again and were subsequently 
presented with the second block of dilemmas, following the same procedure 
used with the first block. The font used and the identity of dilemmas varied 
according to the counterbalancing of both factors. 
Finally, participants were asked to respond to the questions 
concerning the content of dilemmas (two for the fillers and two for the 
moral dilemmas), followed by the final mood assessment. 
RESULTS 
First, to test our hypotheses concerning the effect of fluency we ran a 
2 (Fluency: fluent vs. disfluent, within-subjects) x 2 (Dilemma Type: 
personal vs. impersonal, within-subjects) x 2 (Order of experimental blocks, 
between-subjects, fluent first, n1 = 25, disfluent first, n2 = 26) mixed 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on participants’ responses to the dilemmas 
(see Table 1 for the means and standard errors for each combination of 
Fluency, Dilemma Type, and Order). This analysis yielded a main effect of 
Fluency, F (1, 49) = 5.60, p = .02, ηp2 = .10, reflecting that the disfluent 
condition was associated with higher acceptability ratings than the fluent 
condition (Disfluent M = 3.29, SE = .15; Fluent M = 3.01, SE = .18), 
supporting hypothesis H1. However, this pattern was qualified by an 
interaction between Fluency and Order, F (1, 49) = 5.60, p = .02, ηp2 = .10. 
A post hoc Tukey’s test for unequal group sizes revealed that the effect of 
fluency was significant when the disfluent block was presented first, p = 
.008, but not when the fluent block was presented first, p = 1.00 (see Figure 
1). The analysis also revealed a main effect of Dilemma Type, F (1, 49) = 
50.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .51, suggesting that participants rated the actions 
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proposed in impersonal dilemmas as more acceptable than those proposed 
in personal ones, as expected (Impersonal M = 3.59, SE = .16; Personal M = 
2.71, SE = .17). However, we did not find evidence for our hypothesis that 
effects of processing fluency would be stronger for personal dilemmas than 
for impersonal ones (H2), as the interaction between Fluency and Dilemma 
Type was not significant, F < 1. No other main effect or interactions were 
significant, highest F (1, 49) = 1.48, p = .23, ηp2 = .03.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Responses to moral dilemmas. 
 
Dilemma Order M (SE) 
Fluent   
Personal  Fluent- Disfluent 2.72 (.31) 
Disfluent_Fluent 2.54 (.30) 
   
Impersonal  Fluent- Disfluent 3.20 (.31) 
Disfluent_Fluent 3.58 (.30) 
 
Disfluent   
Personal  Fluent- Disfluent 2.32 (.30) 
Disfluent_Fluent 3.27 (.29) 
   
Impersonal  
 
Fluent- Disfluent 3.60 (.31) 
Disfluent_Fluent 3.96 (.30) 
Note. Mean acceptability ratings (M) and standard errors (SE) as a function of 
Fluency (Fluent vs. Disfluent), Type of Dilemma (Personal vs. Impersonal), and Order of 
blocks (Fluent or Disfluent first). 
 
 
 
Although the analyses above supported our hypothesis concerning the 
effect of fluency (H1), from these analyses alone we cannot firmly conclude 
that disfluent fonts lead to more utilitarian responses. As noted above, 
differences between fluent and disfluent dilemmas were only observed 
when the disfluent dilemmas were presented first. Thus, it is possible that 
this effect is due to the order of presentation and not to the fluency 
manipulation itself. In order to solve the potential confound between our 
fluency manipulation and order, we selected only the first block for each 
participant (that was either fluent or disfluent) and analyzed fluency as a 
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between subject variable5 (means for Personal dilemmas, Fluent M = 2.72, 
SE = .30, Disfluent M = 3.27, SE = .27; Impersonal, Fluent M = 3.20, SE = 
.31, Disfluent M = 3.96, SE = .30). The 2 (Dilemma Type: personal vs. 
impersonal, within-subjects) x 2 (Fluency: fluent vs. disfluent, between-
subjects) mixed ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Dilemma 
Type, F (1, 49) = 4.62, p = .04, ηp2 = .09, indicating that utilitarian 
responses were higher for impersonal dilemmas (Impersonal M = 3.58, SE = 
.21; Personal M = 2.99, SE = .21). This analysis also revealed a marginally 
significant main effect of Fluency F (1, 49) = 4.00, p = .05, ηp2 = .07, 
reflecting higher acceptability ratings for disfluent dilemmas than for fluent 
ones, as expected (Disfluent M = 3.61, SE = .23; Fluent M = 2.96, SE = .23). 
The interaction between Dilemma Type and Fluency, however, was not 
significant, F < 1. Thus we basically obtained the same pattern of results in 
this latter analysis without the potential confound arising between fluency 
and order of presentation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean acceptability ratings for the moral dilemmas presented 
in fluent and disfluent conditions, as a function of the order of 
experimental blocks (disfluent vs. fluent first). Error bars represent ± 1 
SE (standard error).  
 
 
                                                        
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
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Next, we examined whether the time that participants spent reading 
dilemmas varied as a function of fluency or dilemma type. To this end we 
ran another 2 (Fluency: fluent vs. disfluent, within-subjects) x 2 (Dilemma 
Type: personal vs. impersonal, within-subjects) x 2 (Order of experimental 
blocks, between-subjects) mixed ANOVA on reading times. As reading-
time frequency distributions departed from normality, we log-transformed 
the data (log10), which improved both skewness and kurtosis. The ANOVA 
on log-transformed times revealed a main effect of Dilemma Type, F (1, 49) 
= 10.34, p = .002, ηp2 = .17, whereby participants took longer to read 
impersonal dilemmas than personal ones (Impersonal M = 4.51, SE = .02; 
Personal M = 4.44, SE = .03). However, the main effect of Fluency was not 
significant, F (1, 49) = 1.47, p = .23, ηp2 = .03. The analysis yielded an 
interaction between Fluency and Order that approached conventional levels 
of significance¸ F (1, 49) = 3.92, p = .053, ηp2 = .07. However, post hoc 
tests did not reveal any significant difference between means, lowest p = 
0.12. 
Interestingly, this analysis also revealed an interaction between 
Fluency and Dilemma Type that approached conventional levels of 
significance, F (1, 49) = 3.85, p = .055, ηp2 = .07 (see Figure 2). A Tukey’s 
HSD post hoc test revealed a significant difference in reading times 
between personal fluent and impersonal fluent (p = .01), as well as between 
personal fluent and impersonal disfluent dilemmas (p = .03). No other 
differences were significant (ps > .08). Therefore, we did not find evidence 
that participants spent longer overall reading the disfluent dilemmas than 
the fluent ones, either for personal or for impersonal dilemmas. The finding 
that participants took less time to read personal vs. impersonal fluent 
dilemmas is consistent with the notion that personal dilemmas produce 
quicker emotional responses that trigger deontological responses. 
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Figure 2. Mean log-transformed reading times for personal and 
impersonal moral dilemmas, as a function of the fluency manipulation. 
Error bars represent ± 1 SE (standard error). 
 
A final analysis was performed to examine whether Fluency had an 
effect on participants’ self-reported mood. To this end, we ran a mixed 
ANOVA with Timing of assessment (3 levels: Before, Middle, and End) as 
within subjects factor, and Order (Fluent first vs. Disfluent first) as the 
between subjects factor. This analysis revealed a main effect of Timing of 
assessment, F (2, 98) = 31.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .39 (Before M = 5.22, SE = 
.12; Middle M = 4.45, SE = .15; End M = 4.53, SE = .13). A Tukey’s HSD 
post hoc test revealed that participants’ mood was more positive before 
starting the experiment (M = 5.22), than both after the first block of 
dilemmas (M = 4.45), p < .001, and at the end (M = 4.53), p < .001; there 
was no significant change between those last two ratings, p = .74. The main 
effect of Order and the interaction between Order and Timing of assessment 
were not significant, largest F < 1. That is, participants’ mood became more 
negative after the first block and stayed that way after the second block, 
independently of whether fluent or disfluent fonts were presented first. This 
suggests that disfluency itself did not lead to a more negative mood (or 
fluency to a more positive one). A further analysis contrasting pre and post 
mood measures (before and after the first block of dilemmas, within-
subject) being this fluent or disfluent (between-subject) confirmed a 
reduction of mood from pre to post measures, F (1, 49) = 54.51, p < .001, 
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ηp2 = .53, but not a difference between fluent and disfluent blocks, F < 1, or 
a block by mood interaction, F < 1. Therefore, we did not find evidence of a 
mood change induced by fluency or disfluency, just a slight reduction in 
mood from the start to the end of the completion of the first block of trials 
(Before fluency M = 5.16, SE= .17; After fluency M = 4.32, SE = .21; 
Before disfluency M = 5.27, SE = .16; After disfluency M = 4.58, SE = .20). 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of this experiment was to study the effect of disfluent fonts 
on judgments about moral dilemmas. We hypothesized that when 
participants read dilemmas in a difficult-to-read (disfluent) font vs. an easy-
to-read (fluent) font, they would make more utilitarian decisions. We 
further hypothesized that this effect would be stronger for personal 
dilemmas than for impersonal ones. Our results supported our first 
hypothesis but not the second one. That is, participants endorsed more 
utilitarian actions in the disfluent condition than in the fluent condition 
across dilemma types, although they did so only when the disfluent block of 
dilemmas was presented in first place. However, analyses focusing on the 
first block of dilemmas revealed a similar pattern (i.e., more utilitarian 
responses in the disfluent condition), suggesting that the observed effect 
was not merely an artifact of the order of presentation of dilemmas. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first reported effect of processing fluency 
on decision-making concerning moral dilemmas. 
Taken together, these findings support and extend previous work 
pointing to processing fluency as a metacognitive cue that can have a 
substantial influence on reasoning and judgments across many domains. 
Our findings are consistent with previous work demonstrating that 
disfluency enhances analytic thinking, thus improving performance in 
cognitive tasks (Alter et al., 2007; Diemand-Yauman et al., 2010; Song & 
Schwarz, 2008). Increased analytic thinking can also promote utilitarian 
responses to moral dilemmas (Bartels, 2008; Moore et al., 2008; Paxton et 
al., 2012). In our study, dilemmas written in disfluent fonts may have 
prompted analytic thinking in participants, leading to more utilitarian 
decisions. 
Another possible explanation of our findings relates to the perceived 
psychological distance between stimuli, and how abstractly people 
represent them. Indeed, there is evidence that processing disfluency can 
increase perceived distance and lead to more abstract representations (Alter 
& Oppenheimer, 2008). At the same time, individuals in more abstract 
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mindsets who perceive some distance between themselves and the actions 
proposed in moral dilemmas may be more likely to give utilitarian 
responses, as they might focus more on the desirable consequences of the 
action than on the action itself. Supporting this notion, Aguilar, Brussino, 
and Fernández-Dols (2013) found that participants who were told that the 
proposed action (performing surgery on a man and sacrificing his life to 
save the lives of thousands) would happen in the distant future made more 
utilitarian choices than those who were told that it would happen in the near 
future. 
In a similar vein, it could be argued that disfluent fonts prompted 
participants to be in more abstract mindsets in our study, resulting in more 
utilitarian responses. However, if this were the case, effects of disfluency 
should be stronger for personal dilemmas than for impersonal ones, as the 
killing proposed can be considered as more direct (Moore et al., 2008). 
Responses to personal dilemmas should thus be more affected by 
manipulations that increase the psychological distance between the action 
and its effect, making the killing appear more abstract and less direct. Our 
results, however, did not support this expectation, as disfluency increased 
utilitarian responses similarly for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. 
Another potential alternative explanation to our finding that the 
disfluent font was associated with more utilitarian responses is that 
participants had to slow down to read such font. Indeed, manipulations that 
encourage people to spend more time reading moral dilemmas can increase 
the prevalence of utilitarian responses (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). However, 
our results also revealed that fluency itself did not reliably affect the time 
that participants spent reading dilemmas or their reported mood. This 
implies that the observed effect of disfluency cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of these potentially confounding factors. Interestingly, the 
results showed that, although there was no effect of fluency on reading time 
for either the impersonal or the personal dilemmas, participants took less 
time to read the fluent personal dilemmas than the fluent impersonal ones. 
This difference disappeared for the disfluent dilemmas where both personal 
and impersonal dilemmas recruited similar amounts of time to be read. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that disfluency may trigger analytic 
processing in personal dilemmas, which is necessary to overcome the initial 
automatic emotional response of harm aversion, increasing processing time. 
Similarly, our findings suggest that the observed effect of fluency on 
moral responses was not driven by a change in mood induced by our 
fluency manipulation. In our study, mood was slightly more negative after 
the completion of the first block of trials, regardless of whether this block 
was fluent or disfluent. This suggests that our one-item measure was 
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sensitive enough to detect this reduction following the first block of 
dilemmas, with independence of the font used. However, we did not find 
support for the notion that the experience of fluency triggers a positive 
affective state (see Laham et al., 2009; Lick & Johnson, 2015) or that 
disfluency triggers negative affect (Alter et al., 2009). One reason for these 
discrepancies with previous work may lay on the nature of our moral 
scenarios, which present difficult situations involving emotional reactions 
which may counteract the effect of any affect induced by fluency 
manipulations. 
As with all studies, our investigation has some limitations that could 
be addressed in future work. First, it would be necessary to use additional 
disfluency manipulations beside perceptual fluency. Second, the dilemmas 
used may not reflect situations that people will generally encounter in real 
life, and thus it is not possible to determine to what extent our findings 
would generalize to more realistic situations. However, current 
technological developments such as self-driving cars have created real 
decision situations that resemble to some extent the kind of dilemmas used 
here (e.g., Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan, 2016). Furthermore, there is 
evidence that the patterns of responses found for hypothetical dilemmas 
involving death generalize to dilemmas involving more common kinds of 
harm such as emotional and economic harm (Gold, Pulford, & Colman, 
2013). Third, in the current study we used only four moral dilemmas. While 
the use of a limited number of dilemmas is not an unusual practice in the 
literature of moral decision making (e.g., Costa et al., 2014; Duke & Bègue, 
2015), future research should include more diverse dilemmas to assess the 
generalizability of our findings. Finally, in the current work we did not 
directly assess the mechanisms underlying the effect of disfluency on 
utilitarian responses. Future work should examine this issue more directly. 
This could also help to shed light on our finding that the effect of disfluency 
held only when disfluent fonts were presented first. 
The present work adds evidence to previous studies that highlight 
processing fluency as a pervasive metacognitive cue that affects a wide 
range of human judgments. Our findings suggest that increasing processing 
disfluency by manipulating the font used to present information not only 
reduces cognitive bias and promotes analytic thinking in mathematical or 
logic tasks, but can also affect judgments and decisions in the moral 
domain, biasing people’s responses towards utilitarian decisions. 
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RESUMEN 
El tipo de letra difícil de leer (“disfluent”) produce más 
decisiones utilitarias en dilemas morales  
Investigaciones previas sugieren que las decisiones utilitarias a dilemas 
morales  a menudo tienen origen en procesos cognitivos controlados y 
analíticos. Se sabe además que el procesamiento disfluente puede inducir 
pensamiento analítico y mejorar la ejecución en tareas que requieren lógica 
y reflexión cognitiva. En este estudio se investigó cómo la fluencia de 
procesamiento afecta a la disponibilidad con la que se dan repuestas 
utilitarias a dilemas morales personales e impersonales. Se presentaron a los 
participantes dilemas escritos tanto en una letra fácil (fluent) como difícil de 
leer (disfluent) en dos bloques experimentales diferentes. Se esperaba 
encontrar una asociación entre este último tipo de dilemas y respuestas más 
utilitarias. Los resultados apoyaron esta predicción cuando los dilemas 
disfluent se presentaron en primer lugar, mostrando que los participantes 
subscribían más acciones utilitarias en la condición disfluent que en la 
fluent, tanto para dilemas personales como impersonales. Estos datos 
sugieren que incrementar la disfluencia de procesamiento manipulando el 
tipo de letra utilizado afecta a las decisiones en el ámbito moral. 
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APPENDIX A 
Dilemmas used in the present study (in Spanish) 
 
Practice dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004), slightly modified to make them 
more familiar to Spanish participants. 
 
Brownies (59 words) 
 
Una chica decide hacer una tarta de chocolate. Busca en el libro de recetas y 
encuentra una para la que necesita una taza de nueces. Sin embargo, no le 
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gustan mucho las nueces, y sí las almendras. Afortunadamente tiene nueces 
y almendras suficientes en la despensa, de tal modo que podría hacer la tarta 
con cualquiera de las dos. 
¿Sería apropiado que la chica sustituyese las nueces por almendras para 
evitar comer nueces? 
Standard Turnips (48 words) 
 
Un granjero conduce una cosechadora y está llegando a una bifurcación de 
un camino. Si elige el camino de la izquierda cosechará diez kilos de trigo, 
mientras que si elige el camino de la derecha cosechará veinte kilos. Si no 
hace nada la cosechadora girará a la izquierda. 
¿Sería apropiado que el granjero girara a la derecha para cosechar veinte 
kilos en lugar de diez? 
 
 
Non-Moral Dilemmas (Moore et al., 2008) 
 
Stock Tip (94 words) 
 
Eres un consultor trabajando en un caso para un cliente de una gran 
empresa. Tienes acceso a información confidencial que sería muy útil a los 
inversores. Además conoces a una amiga que trabaja en el mercado de la 
bolsa a quien debes una gran cantidad de dinero. Por proporcionarle alguna 
de esa información confidencial a tu amiga, le podrías ayudar a ganar un 
montón de dinero, mucho más de lo que le debes. Si haces esto, ella 
cancelará tu deuda. Pero darle esa información causaría a los inversores 
perder una gran cantidad de dinero. 
¿Sería apropiado que proporcionaras esa información a tu amiga para que se 
pueda cancelar tu deuda? 
 
Taxes (101 words) 
 
Eres el propietario de un pequeño negocio. Tu negocio llega a fin de mes, 
pero no es muy rentable. Te gustaría mucho comprarte un coche nuevo. Sin 
embargo, su precio está muy lejos de lo que puedes pagar. Se te ocurre que 
podrías bajar tus impuestos si falsificaras uno de tus gastos personales como 
gastos de empresa. Por ejemplo, podrías decir que el estéreo de tu 
habitación está siendo usado en la oficina, o que las cenas con tu mujer en 
restaurantes son cenas con clientes. Esta mentira a la agencia tributaria te 
proporcionaría suficiente dinero para comprarte el nuevo coche. 
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¿Sería apropiado que falsificaras alguno de tus gastos personales como 
gastos de empresa y así poder comprarte un coche nuevo? 
 
Moral Dilemmas (Moore et al., 2008) 
 
Burning Building – Personal Version (129 words) 
 
Tú y otras cinco personas estáis atrapadas en un edificio ardiendo. Sólo hay 
una salida de emergencia por donde podríais escapar de manera segura, pero 
está bloqueada por escombros ardiendo. Ves a otra persona en el pasillo que 
lleva a la salida. Esta persona tiene una herida mortal y está bloqueando un 
pequeño agujero que hay en la puerta de salida. Tú y las cinco personas 
detrás de ti no tenéis tiempo para pasar a través del agujero en la puerta. Te 
das cuenta de que podrías coger al herido y usar su cuerpo como un ariete 
para romper los escombros que hay en el pasillo y que os impiden escapar. 
Haciendo esto es cierto que morirá, aunque, si no lo haces, moriréis tú y las 
otras cinco personas.  
¿Sería apropiado que mataras a esta persona que está malherida para 
salvarte a ti y a los otros cinco? 
 
Burning Building – Impersonal Version (129 words) 
 
Tú y otras cinco personas estáis atrapadas en un edificio ardiendo. Sólo hay 
una salida de emergencia por donde podríais escapar de manera segura, pero 
está bloqueada por escombros ardiendo. Ves a otra persona en el pasillo que 
lleva a la salida. Esta persona tiene una herida mortal y está bloqueando un 
pequeño agujero que hay en la puerta de salida. Tú y las cinco personas 
detrás de ti no tenéis tiempo para pasar a través del agujero en la puerta. 
Hay un sistema de emergencia que puede apagar el fuego eliminando el 
oxígeno del pasillo y tú puedes activarlo apretando un botón. Haciendo esto 
el fuego se apagará, pero la persona herida se ahogará y morirá. Sin 
embargo, si no lo haces, tú y las otras personas moriréis. 
¿Sería apropiado que activaras el sistema de emergencia para salvarte a ti y 
a los otros cinco? 
 
Crying Baby – Personal Version (126 words) 
 
Soldados enemigos se han apoderado de tu pueblo. Tienen órdenes de matar 
a todos los civiles que encuentren. Tú y un grupo de personas del pueblo 
habéis encontrado refugio en el sótano de una casa grande. Afuera se 
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escuchan las voces de los soldados que vienen a la casa en busca de objetos 
valiosos. Tu bebé, que está contigo, empieza a llorar con fuerza. Le cubres 
la boca para amortiguar el sonido de su llanto. Si retiras la mano de su boca, 
su llanto llamará la atención de los soldados, quienes matarán a todos los 
que se encuentran en el sótano, incluyéndote a ti y a tu bebé. Para salvarte a 
ti y salvar a los demás tienes que asfixiar a tu hijo hasta que muera. 
¿Sería apropiado que asfixiases a tu hijo para salvarte a ti y al resto de 
personas que están escondidas? 
 
Crying Baby – Impersonal Version (126 words) 
Soldados enemigos se han apoderado de tu pueblo. Tienen órdenes de matar 
a todos los civiles que encuentren. Tú y un grupo de personas del pueblo 
habéis encontrado refugio en el sótano de una casa grande. Afuera se 
escuchan las voces de los soldados que vienen a la casa en busca de objetos 
valiosos. Tu bebé, que está contigo, empieza a llorar con fuerza. Su llanto 
llamará la atención de los soldados, quienes matarán a todos los que se 
encuentran en el sótano, incluyéndote a ti y a tu bebé. Hay una caldera que 
cuando está activa es muy ruidosa. Si la enciendes, su ruido bloqueará el 
sonido del llanto, pero la habitación se calentará a una temperatura que el 
bebé no podrá soportar y morirá.  
¿Sería apropiado que encendieses la caldera para salvarte a ti y al resto de 
personas escondidas? 
APPENDIX B 
Dilemmas used in the present study (in English). 
 
Practice dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004), slightly modified to make them 
more familiar to Spanish participants. 
 
Brownies 
 
A girl decided to make a chocolate cake. She searches in a recipe book 
finding one that calls for a cup of nuts. However, she does not like nuts, but 
she does almonds. Luckily, she has got enough nuts and almonds in the 
cupboard, so she could make the cake with either. 
Would it be appropriate for her to substitute nuts for almonds in order to 
avoid eating nuts? 
Standard Turnips 
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A farm worker is driving a wheat-harvesting machine approaching a fork in 
the road. By choosing the path on the left, he will harvest ten kilograms of 
wheat, whereas by choosing the path on the right he will harvest twenty 
kilograms. If he does nothing, the wheat-harvesting machine will turn to the 
left.  
Would it be it appropriate for him to turn the wheat-harvesting machine to 
the right in order to harvest twenty kilograms of wheat instead of ten? 
 
Fillers (Moore et al., 2008) 
 
Stock Tip 
 
You are a managing consultant working on a case for a large corporate 
client. You have access to confidential information that would be very 
useful to investors. You also have a friend who plays the stock market and 
to whom you owe a sizable sum of money. By providing her with certain 
confidential information you could help her make a lot of money, 
considerably more that you owe her. If you do this, she will cancel your 
debt. However releasing information could cause other investors to lose a 
great deal of money  
Would it be appropriate for you to release this information to your friend so 
that she will cancel your debt? 
 
Taxes 
 
You are the owner of a small business. Your company is making ends meet, 
but it is not terribly profitable. You would really like to buy a new car. 
However its price is beyond your price range. It occurs to you that you 
could lower your taxes by pretending that some of your personal expenses 
are business expenses. For example, you could say that the stereo in your 
bedroom is being used in the lounge at the office, or that dinners out with 
your wife are dinners with clients. This lie would allow you to hide enough 
money from the IRS to buy the new car. 
Would it be appropriate for you to pretend that certain personal expenses 
are business expenses in order to buy a new car? 
 
Moral Dilemmas (Moore et al., 2008) 
 
Burning Building – Personal Version 
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You and five other people are trapped in a burning building. There is only 
one emergency exit through which all of you could escape to safety, but it is 
blocked by burning debris. You notice another person in the hallway 
leading to the exit. This person has a mortal wound and is blocking a small 
hole at the exit door. You and the five people behind you do not have time 
to climb through the small hole. You realize that you could grab the injured 
man and use his body as a battering-ram to break through the debris 
blockage in the hallway that is preventing your scape. Doing this is certain 
to kill him, although if you do not do it, you and the five people behind you 
will die.  
Would it be appropriate for you to kill this person who is badly injured in 
order to save yourself and the other five people? 
 
Burning Building – Impersonal Version 
 
You and five other people are trapped in a burning building. There is only 
one emergency exit through which all of you could escape to safety, but it is 
blocked by burning debris. You notice another person in the hallway 
leading to the exit. This person has a mortal wound and is blocking a small 
hole at the exit door. You and the five people behind you do not have time 
to climb through the small hole. The hallway’s emergency system puts out 
fire by eliminating oxygen from the hall and you can activate the system by 
pressing a button. By doing that, the fire will go out, but the injured person 
will suffocate and die. However, if you do not do it, you and the five people 
behind you will die.  
Would it be appropriate for you to activate the system in order to save 
yourself and the other five people? 
 
Crying Baby – Personal Version 
 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have found refuge 
in the cellar of a large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who 
have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby, who is with you in 
the room, begins to cry loudly. You put your hand over his mouth to block 
the sound of his crying. If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying 
will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill all of you, including 
you and your baby. To save yourself and the others you must smother your 
baby to death. 
Would it be appropriate for you to smother your baby in order to save 
yourself and the other townspeople who are hiding? 
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Crying Baby – Impersonal Version 
 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have found refuge 
in the cellar of a large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who 
have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby, who is with you in 
the room, begins to cry loudly. His crying will summon the attention of the 
soldiers who will kill all of you, including you and your baby. There is a 
furnace which is very noisy when it is working. If you turn it on, its noise 
would block the sound of the crying, but the room will become deadly hot 
for the baby and he will die.  
Would it be appropriate for you to turn on the furnace in order to save 
yourself and the other townspeople who are hiding? 
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